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ABSTRACT
Critical infrastructure systems have recently become more vulnerable to attacks on their data
systems through internet connectivity. If an attacker is successful in breaching a system’s defenses,
it is imperative that operations are restored to the system as quickly as possible. This thesis focuses
on damage assessment and recovery following an attack. A literature review is first conducted on
work done in both database protection and critical infrastructure protection, then the thesis defines
how damage affects the relationships between data and software. Then, the thesis proposes a model
using a graph construction to show the cascading affects within a system after an attack. This thesis
also presents an algorithm that uses the graph to compute an optimal recovery plan that prioritizes
the most important damaged components first so that the vital modules of the system become
functional as soon as possible. This allows for the most critical operations of a system to resume
while recovery for less important components is still being performed. The thesis shows results
from simulations using the recovery algorithm on data graphs with various parameters. After that,
a second model is proposed that accounts for the time elapsed after an attack to perform a more
precise damage assessment. By doing this, it can be determined how far damage can spread, then
unaffected parts of the system can be released for possible use. Simulations are also done on this
model to show the changes in damage assessment when different parameters are altered.
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INTRODUCTION

Critical infrastructure systems are those that are considered extremely critical to the functioning
of a government or a country. As described in [2], critical infrastructures are like the vital organs
of a human body that need to perform their own roles for the whole body to function efficiently
and painlessly. The US Department of Homeland Security [3] declares that such systems are “so
vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on
our physical or economic security or public health or safety.” Therefore, the protection and
smooth functioning of our nation’s critical infrastructures are indispensable and cannot be
ignored.
These systems are becoming prime targets of attackers – primarily state actors – and a
major attack on one can cripple the economy of the victim nation. These systems are also more
likely to be connected to the internet now to provide benefits like cost reduction (where large
systems can be remotely managed over the public network), increased capability (by providing
sufficient computing resources for infrastructure hardware with less capability power), and
improved efficiency and transaction speed. This connectivity unfortunately makes it easier for
attackers to hack into these systems. Consider the New York Times report about the attack on
Colonial Pipeline [4]. While the details of the attack are not yet disclosed, a group of
cybercriminals were able to compromise data systems using the internet, which resulted in
Colonial Pipeline shutting down their pipeline. This outage affected mass transit and other
industries across the entire U.S. East Coast and exposed a lack of preparation for such a crisis.
This illustrates how an external system can have a relationship with a critical infrastructure
system and how such relationships can be exploited to carry out an attack.
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It is clear from past incidents and recent reports ([5]-[8]), to cite just a few) that attacks
on critical infrastructures are occurring frequently, which indicates that prevention mechanisms
are not enough to stop them. Thus, it is of utmost importance to aggressively prepare for post
attack activities, which include damage assessment and recovery mechanisms that are critical to
making the affected systems available at full functioning mode as soon as possible. This
research aims at meeting this important goal.
This thesis proposes a framework that models damage spread within a set of data objects
based on object dependencies and prioritizes making repairs to the most critical objects first. The
framework is based on some of the models explored in critical infrastructure protection and uses
a version of previously proposed repair methods that is modified to focus on meeting specific
goals when determining the order in which repairs are made. Furthermore, a second model is
proposed that assesses damage using the time elapsed since an initial attack to determine which
section of a critical system is damaged with greater precision than usual. Experiments are
performed to test both models by simulating critical systems with different parameters and
comparing how damage assessment and recovery changes between the systems.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers some work performed in
this area and explains how this work is relevant to the goal of this thesis. Chapter 3 defines the
problem that this thesis aims to build the two models for. In Chapter 4, the types of relationships
that exist in data systems are presented and explained. Details on the damage recovery model are
given in Chapter 5, which includes three subsections to establish the definitions, model
description, and algorithm, and Chapter 6 presents results from the experiments done on this
model. Chapter 7 covers the definitions, description, and algorithm for the damage assessment
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model, and Chapter 8 shows the experiments and results from simulating that model. Chapter 9
concludes the work.
2

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

This thesis aims to examine methods and frameworks used for database and critical
infrastructure protection and apply it towards protecting a set of data objects. This section
describes some of the publications that are relevant to the proposed framework. Various types of
critical infrastructure objects are described in [17]. The focus of this thesis falls under network
and network nodes, which are defined as a “structure with one dominating dimension”, and
junctions within the network, respectively. Furthermore, [18] establishes the concept of
resilience, a cyclical process by which a system undergoes recovery, adaptation, and prevention
between attacks. Turning this concept into a concrete value that can be used in risk assessment
has been a point of interest in protecting systems [20]. Efforts have also been made to quantify
vulnerability as a measurement that can be used to determine how frequently or severely a
system can be at risk [19]. One of the major works on damage assessment and recovery within a
database uses data dependency to find data affected by an attack to optimize recovery [9]. While
this method relies on the direct relationships between data items, an alternate model to recover
data from an attack instead uses the transaction log for assessment [10].
Kotzanikolaou et. al describe a model in [11] that assists in risk assessment for possible
scenarios that can result in cascading failures within a CI system. For critical infrastructures with
data-rich operations, the use of Cyber-Physical Systems can cause new vulnerabilities as
described in [12]. Their model analyzes threats that can appear due to these vulnerabilities and
analyzes the potential cascading damage they can cause. System dynamics modeling can also be
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used to analyze disruptive events to characterize such disruptions to critical infrastructure by risk
assessment and various impact factors as shown in [13].
Rehak et. al [14] model an infrastructure system as elements and linkages with different
types of relationships establishing dependencies and interdependencies. They note that these
elements can have varying criticality, causing some elements to cascade more damage into the
system than others in the event of a failure. This work is important because by establishing
criticality, they quantify damage within a system. This concept of criticality is used in later
chapters to direct the optimal repair path of data objects.
This thesis also considers models that assist with recovery during an attack. In [15], an
algorithm is proposed to restore damaged element paths by recursively breaking down demand
flows into simpler problems. They use a centrality metric to rank damaged nodes and determine
which ones should be repaired first and expand on the use of centrality to make repair decisions
in further work [16]. This thesis uses the concept of centrality to rank data objects in a case
where two or more are equally critical. In the proposed damage assessment algorithm, their
method of simplifying damage paths is utilized to find the fastest route to restoring intermediate
data objects. However, the novelty of the proposed approach is twofold: all components must be
repaired within the system because data objects cannot have computations rerouted, unlike the
network components in the work that has been reviewed, and the proposed method aims to
restore the most important components first so that their functions can be restored while repairs
to the system are still ongoing.
The work of Narayanan et. al [1] provides inspiration for the second model presented in
this thesis. They present centrality metrics used to identify important water flows within a
network of pipes using factors such as water volume and demand at different areas. While these
4

factors do not exist in a data critical system, there are similar ones that do exist, such as the
frequency by which a node is updated with data from another node. If the elapsed time since an
attack is known, this frequency can be used to trace damage spread along the nodes that can be
affected by the damage. This is elaborated on in Chapter 7.
3

PROBLEM DEFINITIONS

In the occasion when an adversary information attack succeeds, the victim must have the
capability to degrade gracefully and recover damaged data and/or services in real-time if it is to
survive. It is necessary to immediately carry out damage assessment and recovery process in
order to bring the systems to working states. Otherwise, the damage would spread to other
unaffected systems that are interconnected. This happens when a valid user or an unaffected
system module reads a damaged object during its computation and updates another object based
on the compromised value, causing the latter damaged as well. As time goes on, more and more
objects become affected in this manner causing the spread of damage to fan out through the
system quickly.
For damage assessment and recovery purpose, information about all processes that have
been executed must be stored in the log (more on this presented later). This will help in
determining the relationships among the processes, thus helping in establishing the damage trail.
Moreover, during recovery, the operations of processes that have spread the damage have to be
undone and then redone in order to produce correct states of affected objects. The problems with
existing systems are: (1) They do not store process execution information in the log, and they
purge the log periodically, (2) Their recovery mechanisms are not designed to undo the effects of
executed processes, (3) The size of the log, as it must not be purged, will make it almost
impossible to continue the recovery process in real-time, and (4) During the damage assessment
5

and recovery process, the system remains unavailable to users. This delay induces a denial-ofservice attack, which is highly undesirable in time-critical applications that the critical
infrastructures are designed to provide. Due to massive amount of data in the log that needs to
be processed, the problem becomes even worse.
The goal of this research is to develop fast, accurate, and efficient damage assessment
and recovery techniques so that critical information systems not only survive the attacks
gracefully but will continue to operate providing as many vital services and functions as possible
even before the system is fully recovered. The next section explains how the relationships
between different parts of critical systems can affect the spread of damage.
4

TYPES OF DAMAGE DEPENDENCIES

Attacks can affect not only data systems, but also software that produces data. This happens
when the software is maliciously changed to perform unintended actions. This chapter covers
possible attack scenarios involving damaged data objects and software and how they can cascade
into other system.
4.1

Data to Data Damage

Data objects are frequently dependent on other data objects for computational updates. This
makes their systems vulnerable to malicious attacks and cascading damage. Once a data object
uses a damaged object to make a change, it becomes damaged too. This can happen to as many
objects as the initially attacked objects have that are dependent on it. Figure 1 shows an example
of cascading damage between data objects. If node C is targeted for an attack, then node E will
become damaged due to its dependency on C. Then, node F and node G are also damaged
because they are dependent on E.
6

Figure 1. Cascading Damage from a Data Object
4.2

Software to Software Damage

If damaged software is used to influence computing done by another software, then the output of
that software is also considered damaged. An example of a dependency between software is the
use of libraries for applications. A damaged procedure within a library will result in damaged
output for any software that calls that procedure. One difficulty with recovering from cascading
damage from software to software is that it may be difficult to identify which cross-software
calls used damaged procedures for computation. Consider a program P that uses two library
functions A and B. A is an undamaged function and provides an undamaged output, while B is
damaged and results in a damaged output. Even though it is known that the library is damaged, it
is difficult to find which functions within the library are specifically damaged due to library
already being compiled into binary format. Therefore, it is not known if A or B is damaged, and
after the library has been recovered, P must be executed entirely to ensure that the correct output
is obtained, which causes recovery time to increase. After recovery, the resulting output from A
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is unchanged, while the output from B is corrected to the desired result. An example of softwareto-software damage is shown in Figure 2. Even though the data is correct, a maliciously changed
library can result in the software changing the output data.

Figure 2. Cascading Damage through Software
4.3

Software to Data Damage

Any data changed by damaged software is also considered damaged. This is the simplest
scenario involving damaged software because it is functionally the same as cascading damage
between two data objects. After the software is repaired, any data that was damaged by the
software must be computed again to complete recovery.
4.4

Data to Software Damage

Software that uses damaged data will not become damaged as a result. However, its output data
will be considered damaged. This is because once a program is compiled, it cannot be changed
by its input data. Therefore, if a software uses incorrect data to produce a damaged output, it is
considered data-to-data damage instead. In Figure 3, a damaged node A is used as input for
computation in a software. While the software itself is not damaged, its output nodes D and E
become damaged.
8

Figure 3. Cascading Damage from Data through Software
In the next section, the first model is presented. The aim of this model is to identify and recover
damage optimally in detail. While it is important to consider the possibility of damaged software
affecting a system, the model focuses on the spread of damage within data objects. This is
because damage can spread much faster through data objects than in software, and usually does
so more frequently. Furthermore, software can also be quickly fixed, while data objects are more
numerous and may need many computations to get the desired output after repairs.
5

CRITICAL SYSTEMS DAMAGE RECOVERY MODEL

In this section, the first model is described in detail. The first subsection defines important
graphs and metrics that are used for the first model. The second subsection provides details on
how the model is built and is used to determine an optimal recovery plan. Finally, the algorithm
used to implement the model is described.
5.1

Definitions

First, the concept of information flow in a system must be defined. This also establishes
dependencies among various objects in the system and is used in the graph-based model.
9

Definition 1: Given two objects Oi and Oj in a system, if the value of Oj is calculated using the
value of Oi, there is information flow from Oi to Oj. Thus, Oj is said to be dependent on Oi and is
denoted as Oi → Oj.
The above definition helps in determining the spread of damage in the system. That is, if
an object is damaged, then all its dependent objects will be considered damaged. During
recovery, the parent (pre-cursor) object must be recovered before any of its dependent objects
can be recovered.
Next, the graph containing the set of objects and all possible paths among them is
defined. This is called the Possible Paths Graph and it spans the entire system of objects and all
dependency paths among them. An example of this graph is shown by Figure 4(a).

Figure 4a. The Possible Paths Graph (PPG)
Definition 2: Consider a system containing the set of objects O. The Possible Paths Graph
(PPG) is built by having a node Ni for each object in O. There exists an edge Eij from Ni to Nj in
the PPG if there is a possibility that information may flow from Ni to Nj, that is, Nj may be
modified based on the value of Ni.
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The purpose of building a PPG is that it will help during the damage assessment
preparation phase. By assuming the point of attack one can identify the set of items that may be
affected consequently. Thus, security officers can be prepared for different types of eventualities.
The second set of objects contains the actual paths that were used to make changes in the
system within a specified time span, which for the purposes of the third graph that will be
defined, is usually the time passed since an object has been damaged. This set is represented by
the Active Paths Graph (APG), and all objects and dependencies in this set exist in the PPG. This
graph will help in determining the damage flow in case of an attack. Given an initial attack point
(an object), one can determine which objects in the system may be affected by the attack and
which ones will not be. Therefore, the ability of the system to carry out its intended functions
can be calculated. That is, during the recovery process, the set of damaged objects will be made
unavailable while the rest can be made accessible. Knowing which objects will remain
unaffected, one will be able to identify what services the system will be able to offer while the
recovery continues.
Definition 3: The Active Paths Graph (APG) contains nodes N and edges E such that for every
Ni є N and every Eij є E, both Ni and Eij are also present in PPG, and Eij illustrates an actual
information flow; that is Nj was updated based on the value of Ni.

Figure 4b. The Active Paths Graph (APG)
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Figure 4(b) provides an example of an Active Paths Graph and as can be seen it is a subgraph of Figure 4(a). As discussed before, once an initial attack point is determined, the APG
will help in accurately determining the damage flow and the set of objects affected by the attack.
As discussed before, as time goes on, more and more objects will be affected as new objects will
be updated based on the value of an affected object. Thus, to stop the spread of damage, all
affected objects must be quickly identified and taken offline as soon as possible. This can be
achieved by doing a flow assessment using the APG. This leads to the concept of actual damage
spread path showing exactly which objects were affected by an attack. If a system is damaged,
the spread of damage is represented as a third set of objects, the Damage Spread Graph (DSG).
The set of objects and dependencies in this graph must exist within the APG, as damage spread
occurs when objects make changes based on their dependencies. Like how the APG is a
subsection of the PPG, the DSG is a subsection of the APG. Figure 4(c) is an example of what a
damage path may look like. It is important to note that over time, a damaged object will always
cascade its damage down to dependent nodes included in the APG. Definition 4 formally defines
the DSG.
Definition 4: A Damage Spread Graph (DSG) contains nodes N and edges E such that for every
Ni є N and every Eij є E, both Ni and Eij are also present in APG and every node in N is damaged
through an attack on the system. Moreover, an edge Eij depicts that Ni was damaged first and
then Nj was damaged through the flow of information from Ni to Nj.

Figure 4c. The Damage Spread Graph (DSG)
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Note that the edges between two objects may be bidirectional or recursive. For example,
if an object Oj can have a dependency on object Oj and vice versa, then there will be a
bidirectional edge between Oj and Oj.

Similarly, if an object can be dependent on itself, it will

result in a recursive graph. To clarify, let us consider an object “salary”. When an employee
receives an increment that is based on a percentage of the current salary of the employee, it
causes the new salary to be dependent on the old salary and is depicted by using an edge from
salary to salary itself. However, it must be noted that, for simplicity, neither bidirectional nor
recursive edges are used in the APG or DSG. Rather, when an object is modified, it is noted as a
new instance of the object, thus creating a new node for the object with the version number
indicating when the object is in that state.
To minimize the time needed to restore the most important objects within a system of
object dependencies, the following criteria used to determine the order in which repairs are made
is defined:
Definition 5: The criticality of a node N is its predetermined level of importance to the system’s
functions.
This must be predetermined for the flexibility of the model to fit various systems and
align the model with the goals of each specific system. For example, one system may need to
prioritize certain components that other systems do not. The criticality of a component can be
measured by various characteristics such as the intensity or scope of an impact caused by its
failure as described in [14].
A positive whole number is assigned to each node N to represent criticality. A lower
assigned value indicates higher criticality. For example, a node Ni with a criticality of 2 would be
considered more important than a node Nj with a criticality of 4. It is important to note that
13

criticality values are not unique, meaning multiple nodes can have the same criticality value.
When that happens, the following metric is used in the next definition to serve as a first
“tiebreaker”.
Definition 6: Objects that have more damaged dependencies take longer to repair. Therefore,
the repair time of a node N is defined as how many inward-flowing edges Ei it is receiving
damage from.
When two or more objects are assigned the same importance, the model chooses to first
repair the one that has a lower repair time. For example, consider two nodes Ni and Nj that are
equally critical. If Ni needs 5 other nodes repaired to repair it, and Nj needs 3 other nodes to
repair it, then Nj will be repaired first, because its operation can be restored more quickly than
that of Ni.
Definition 7: The centrality of a node N is the number of outward-flowing edges Eo it has.
The above metric is used to decide the next object to repair when two or more are equal in both
criticality and repair time. An object with a higher number of Eo will have higher centrality. Figure
5a and Figure 5b show two subsections of a DSG that highlights centrality. As shown in Figure
5a, N4 has three nodes that are dependent on it: N1, N2, and N3, while as Figure 5b depicts, N6 only
has a single node N5 dependent on it. Assume that the repair algorithm has repaired the parent
node(s) of N4 and that of N6. To clarify the situation, N4 and N6 need not have the same parents; it
is just that both are in line to be repaired next. In this scenario, repairing N4 before N6 reduces the
repair time for the three dependent nodes of N4 instead of only one of N6, which can make future
repairs be performed faster. Therefore, N4 is considered to have a higher centrality than N6.
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Figure 5a. A parent node with high centrality

Figure 5b. A parent node with low centrality
Definition 8: The relationships between all nodes n in a data system can be expressed by an
adjacency matrix 𝛢𝛢, where each element represents an edge ei,j between nodes ni and nj such that
the parent node is given by the element’s row and the child node is given by the element’s
column.
The value of each element is binary – if an edge going from one node to another exists,
then the value of its respective element is 1, otherwise, it is 0. Therefore, for each element 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 in
Α:

1 if (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = �
.
0 if (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) ∉ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖

(1)
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Figure 6 depicts the PPG shown in Figure 4a. as an adjacency matrix. Each cell with a
value of 1 is an existing edge on the graph. For example, node D has 3 parent nodes and 2 child
nodes. The edges coming from nodes A, B, and C are highlighted on D’s row. Likewise, its
outgoing edges toward nodes F and G are highlighted on D’s column. All node relationships are
translated this way, so as there are 8 edges in the graph, there is also 8 highlighted elements in
Figure 6.
Since an adjacency matrix can be used to represent the relationships between data nodes
in a uniform manner, it is used for the implementation of the damage recovery planning
algorithm, which will be covered in the next two subsections.

Figure 6. An adjacency matrix of Figure 4a.
5.2

Model Description

The model uses the three graphs defined in the previous section to construct a representation of a
given system and its sustained damage from the time of the initial attack. The PPG is a
preprocessed map of all components and dependency paths within a system. It is assumed that it
16

is known how much time has passed since the initial attack and build the APG by including
components and dependency paths that were used in a transaction log in that period. By knowing
the component where the initial attack occurred, the DSG is built by tracing the damage through
the transaction log. For damage to spread from one component to the next, it must follow two
criteria: 1) there is a damaged node Ni that has an edge Eij flowing from it to node Nj and 2) Eij is
used for a transaction while Ni is damaged. For the DSG to exist, the initial attack must occur
within the APG, otherwise there is no cascading damage.
The goal of the model is to find the optimal sequence of repairs to restore the most important
operations of a system as quickly as possible. The metrics defined in the previous section are used
to decide which components should be repaired first. The first metric is criticality – the most
critical components must be restored first to resume important operations. However, these
components may also be dependent on other components that are damaged. These components
must be repaired first before the base component can be repaired. At this point, the same problem
is applied to the dependency components, and the most critical one is chosen first. If there is a tie,
then components with a lower repair time are picked first. For example, a component that has two
damaged parent components will be prioritized over a component with three or more damaged
parent components if both components are equally critical.
To clarify, consider the graph presented in Figure 7. As shown in the figure, nodes N1, N2,
and N3 are dependent on N4. Assume that the damage assessment method identified N4 as
damaged; thus, nodes N1, N2, and N3 are also identified as damaged. During the recovery
process, N4 was recovered before the other three nodes. However, since it has three dependents
all of which are damaged, the question is, which one should be repaired first. As the goal is to
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have the vital functions of the system to be made available before the other operations, the
algorithm would choose the node among N1, N2, and N3 having the most criticality.

Figure 7. Recovery Sequence Decision
Repair time is not affected by how the parent components are ordered. For example, consider
two scenarios with nodes N1, N2, N3, and N4. In the first scenario, node N1 is dependent on nodes
N2, N3, and N4. In the second scenario, node N1 is dependent on node N2, node N2 is dependent on
node N3, and node N3 is dependent on node N4. In both scenarios, nodes N4, N3, and N2 must all
be repaired before node N1 can be repaired, so N1 will always have the same repair time. In short,
repair time can simply be considered as the number of upstream components. Similarly, the third
metric, centrality, can be considered as the number of downstream components. This is the third
metric used to determine repair order in case multiple components are equal in criticality and repair
time. This metric is not prioritized over the first two because it does not directly contribute toward
the stated goals of the model, but it can optimize future repairs by lowering the repair time of more
components than repairing other components would.
5.3

Model Algorithm

First, the primary objective of the model is described. Consider the notations used in the following
table:
18

TABLE I.

NOTATIONS

Notations

Descriptions

𝑃𝑃 = (𝑉𝑉, 𝐸𝐸)

Possible Path Graph

= (𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 , 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 )

𝑉𝑉, 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 ⊆ 𝐸𝐸)

𝐴𝐴

Active Path Graph ( 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 ⊆

𝐷𝐷

Damage Spread Graph ( 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 ⊆

= (𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 , 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 )
𝐷𝐷

= (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 , 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 )
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 , 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 ⊆ 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 )

Critical Node Graph ( 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 ⊆
𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 , 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 ⊆ 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 )

Decision to fix edge 𝑖𝑖 to 𝑗𝑗
Decision to fix node 𝑖𝑖
Time to fix node 𝑖𝑖

Centrality of node 𝑖𝑖

Dependency indicator of node
𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗

The objective is to find min ∑𝑖𝑖∈𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 subject to

𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ ∑𝑗𝑗∈𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶

(2)

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶

(4)

𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ≥ ∑(𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗)∈𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶

𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 , (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶

(3)

(5)

That is, the goal is to minimize the time required to fix all critical nodes subjected to conditional
constraints of the system. To make sure that each preceding nodes of 𝑖𝑖 are fixed before node 𝑖𝑖

being processed, condition (2) is used. For example, if there is a node 𝑗𝑗 connecting to 𝑖𝑖 but in a
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prequel order, the sum product of all nodes 𝑗𝑗 status and dependency indicator 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 should be greater

or equal than the product of sum of all dependency indicator 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with node 𝑖𝑖. To make sure that

there would not be more out-going flows than the given capability of node 𝑖𝑖, equation (3) is

imposed to make sure the total out-going edge would not surpass the centrality of node 𝑖𝑖.

Conditions (4) and (5) were built to impose the binary attribute of the dependency indicator 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
the decision whether to fix node 𝑖𝑖 or edge from node 𝑖𝑖 to node 𝑗𝑗.

The algorithms provided in this section use the model described in the previous section to compute
the optimal order of repairs to restore the most important functions of a system first. When an
attack occurs, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is expected to identify the attack and provide
the initial point of damage. The working principles of IDSs are not within the scope of this work
and so, not described here.
Algorithm 1 creates the PPG from the system’s data. The PPG must record all possible
dependency paths, including those that may not have been used by the system yet. Therefore, it is
necessary to consult the system’s designers so the algorithm can be provided full information on
the system’s data objects to fully construct the PPG. As stated in Definition 8, the PPG, APG, and
DSG are all represented by a binary adjacency matrix, where child nodes and parent nodes are
represented by the columns and rows, respectively. Each element in one such matrix is the edge
between the given parent and child node, with a value of 1 indicating that the edge does exist in
the graph and a value of 0 indicating that it does not exist.

Algorithm 1: Initializing the Possible Paths Graph
Result: Adjacency matrix 𝑀𝑀PPG representing the PPG
1 for each object 𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥 and 𝑂𝑂𝑦𝑦 in the system
1.1 if edge 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 can exist
1.2 𝑀𝑀PPG (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = 1
2 Return 𝑀𝑀PPG
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After receiving notification from an IDS, a precise damage assessment is performed. If the
damage assessment process is unable to make accurate assessment, i.e., in case a damaged node is
not correctly identified, it and its dependent nodes, which are also damaged, will remain
unrecovered. This will result in valid users or procedures reading them and spreading damage by
updating other objects, as discussed earlier. For a detailed discussion on damage assessment, one
may review [9] and [10], which were developed particularly for database systems. However, the
methods are still applicable to critical infrastructure systems. A basic mechanism to carry out the
assessment is provided below.
Damage assessment begins with the APG, which shows the actual dependency relationships
among the objects in the system (Note that the APG can be built as transactions are executed and
dependencies are established among various nodes of the PPG). Given the initial attack point, the
corresponding node is then marked as damaged. This is the starting node of the DSG. Then by
scanning the log from the corresponding location of the attack point, transactions that read the
marked node are identified. Any objects written by those transactions are then marked as damaged
in the APG. This process continues until the end of the log. Finally, all unmarked nodes and the
edges showing their dependencies are removed. The resulting graph is the completed DSG.
The APG is constructed in Algorithm 2. This algorithm reads the transaction log and creates a
node each time a new data object is mentioned in the log. The object’s dependencies are depicted
as the node’s edges in the APG. When an existing data object is updated, it becomes a new object
in the transaction log. As described earlier, this is done to prevent recursive dependencies in the
APG.
Once damage assessment is carried out, recovery procedure must begin immediately in order
to make the system operational quickly. Algorithm 3 is used as the main procedure to initialize an
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object set for repairs. The algorithm starts by initializing the set of damaged objects O. Each node
N within O consists of a system component and its relationships with other nodes in O. As
mentioned previously under Definition 4, some system components may have recursive or
bidirectional dependencies between each other. Therefore, system components can have repeat
nodes within O to represent their different versions. Each node is assigned values for criticality,
repair time, and centrality. Using those metrics, the algorithm determines an initial target node N0
based on criticality. If there are two or more nodes with the highest criticality, then the node with
the lower repair time is selected. In the event of another tie, the node with higher centrality is
selected. Further ties are broken by random selection. N0, along with O and the repair queue Q, are
used to make the first call to the recursive function Algorithm 3.1 at step 4.5. Algorithm 3 proceeds
until O is completely empty, and then the repair queue is finalized, and Q is printed.
As previously discussed, a node must have its parent nodes repaired before it can be considered
eligible for repairs. Algorithm 3.1 ensures that nodes are scheduled for repairs in the proper order
while still adhering to the rules set for determining priority. It does this by using a while loop to
check the currently selected node N for repair eligibility. If N is eligible for repairs, then it is
removed from O and Q is updated, then returned. If N is not eligible, then O’, a subsection of O
made up of all dependency paths above the currently selected node is created and used to find the
next highest priority node N’ within O’. Algorithm 3.1 is recursively called using N’ and O’, which
can either result in the node’s repair or another node being selected for repair again. The recursive
nature of this algorithm ensures that each time a decision needs to be made on which node needs
to be repaired next, it will prioritize criticality and efficiency among all the nodes that can be
repaired at any given step. In this way, the bulk of the work done by the algorithm is choosing the
next object for repair within each iteration. Each function call will result in one object being
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repaired and 𝑛𝑛 − 1 additional function calls, where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of nodes within the set of

nodes being passed. Since repaired objects need to be removed from the DSG, function calls will
need to update and return the global DSG and Q.

Algorithm 2: Initializing the Actual Paths Graph
Result: Adjacency matrix 𝑀𝑀APG representing the APG
Parameters: transaction log T, containing the set of edges E that were used to make updates
1 For each edge 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 in T
1.1 𝑀𝑀APG (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = 1
2 Return 𝑀𝑀APG
Algorithm 3: Initialization for object set repair
Result: Queue of objects ordered by repair priority
1 Initialize set of damaged objects O
2 Preprocess object priority using criticality, repair
time, and centrality
3 Initialize repair queue Q
4 while O has damaged nodes remaining
4.1 Select the highest critical node(s) N within O
4.2 if Two or more nodes are tied for highest
criticality
4.2.1 Select the node(s) N with the lowest repair
time R within O
4.3 if Two or more nodes are tied for lowest repair
time
4.3.1 Select the node(s) N with the highest
centrality within O
4.4 if Two or mode nodes are tied for highest
centrality
4.4.1 Select a single node at random from those
still tied
4.5 Update repair queue(N0, O, Q) → Q
5 Print Q
Algorithm 3.1: Recursive repair function
Result: Schedules a node N for repairs and returns the updated repair queue Q
1 Update repair queue(Selected node N, object set O, repair queue Q):
2 while Current object has unrepaired dependencies:
2.1 Create subset of damaged nodes O’ of all nodes
N’ and edges E’ that N is dependent on
2.2 Select the highest critical node(s) N’ within O’
2.3 if Two or more nodes are tied for highest
criticality
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2.3.1 Select the node(s) N’ with the lowest
repair time R within O
2.4 if Two or more nodes are tied for lowest repair
time
2.4.1 Select the node(s) N’ with the highest
centrality within O
2.5 if Two or mode nodes are tied for highest
centrality
2.5.1 Select a single node at random from those
still tied
2.6 Update repair queue(N’0 , O’, Q) → Q
2.7 Remove the most recent object in repair queue
from O
3 Repair N
4 Add N to Q
5 Return Q
The algorithm produces a list of system nodes in the order in which they should be repaired.
Recovery procedure then continues to the next step to begin repairs on the system. It is important
to note that while repairs are simulated by the algorithm, the process for repairing the actual
components of the system is not within the scope of this work.

6 EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS FOR RECOVERY MODEL
6.1

Experiment Description

The efficiency of the recovery model was evaluated by using it to find the number of nodes
needed to repair every critical node in a DSG simulation with various parameters. The simulation
constructed a DSG with randomly assigned relationships between nodes. The parameters used to
build each DSG were total nodes, percentage of critical nodes, maximum number of parent nodes
per node, and maximum number of children nodes per node. After the DSG was built, the set of
critical nodes was randomly picked from the entire DSG for the model to compute the required
repairs. For each simulation, 25 different sets of critical nodes were tested, and the average
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number of required repairs was reported by the simulation. Four experiments were run to test the
changes to the number of required repairs caused by changing each parameter. For every
experiment, the control variables were set to be 10,000 total nodes, 5% critical nodes, and a
maximum of 6 parent nodes and 6 child nodes per node. Then, this method was compared to
modified versions of two common traversal algorithms: breadth-first search (BFS) and depthfirst search (DFS). The BFS algorithm repaired nodes starting with all the root nodes, then all the
children of the root nodes, and then the next set of child nodes until it reached the bottom. On the
other hand, DFS repairs a single parent node, then repairs one of its child nodes, and repeats that
process until it reaches a node with no children. When that happens or if it has already repaired
all child nodes for a given node, it goes back up to the previous node and repairs another child
node. The exception to this process is if a node has other parent nodes that have not been
repaired yet. The algorithm will break the traditional BFS or DFS order to ensure that the node is
eligible for repair. The results for the BFS and DFS repair algorithms are included with the
model’s results.
6.2

Results and Analysis

Two sets of graphs are presented for each round of simulations in Figures 8 and 9. Figure 8 consists
of four bar graphs highlighting the different in required repairs between the model’s algorithm and
BFS and DFS traversals. Figure 9 has four graphs showing the changes in the percentage of nodes
repaired between each parameter of a simulation. The results for required repairs based on total
nodes are shown in Figure 8a. Figure 9a. shows that the required repairs maintain a constant ratio
between it and the total nodes with the given control variables, as each experiment resulted in a
little less than 25% of the total nodes needing to be repaired.
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Figure 8a. Required repairs based on total nodes

Percentage of Nodes Repaired for Number of
Total Nodes Simulations
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Figure 9a. Changes in required repairs based on maximum number of total nodes

Figure 8b. shows the results for required repairs needed for different percentages of critical
nodes. While the number of required repairs increases as the percentage of critical nodes increases,
less additional repairs are needed when the percentage is higher. Therefore, a high number of
critical nodes require less repairs per critical node than a lower number of critical nodes. This is
affirmed in Figure 9b., as percentage of nodes repaired steadily rises as the percentage of critical
nodes increases.
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Figure 8b. Required repairs based on critical node percentage
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Figure 9b. Changes in required repairs based on percentage of critical nodes

Figures 8c. and 8d. show the change in required repairs for different maximums of children
and parent nodes per node respectively. With a low number of maximum children per node, more
repairs are required. This is because the system of nodes becomes narrower in shape. In contrast,
when there is a higher maximum of parent nodes per node, the required repairs see an increase.
This indicates that a critical node is more likely to have additional parent nodes, which would
require more repairs than a critical node with fewer parent nodes. These changes mirror each other
27

in Figures 9c. and 9d. as well. However, when the maximum number of child or parent nodes
becomes high enough, it appears to have less of an effect on the number of nodes repaired as it
does at lower values.

Figure 8c. Required repairs based on maximum number of child nodes

Figure 8d. Required repairs based on maximum number of parent nodes
Across all graphs, targeting specific nodes for repair drastically shortens the time needed
to recover critical functions, as the average required repairs for the BFS and DFS algorithm in
most simulations was slightly less than the total number of nodes in the simulation.
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Figure 9c. Changes in required repairs based on the maximum number of child nodes per node
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Figure 9d: Changes in required repairs based on the maximum number of parent nodes per node

6.3

On BFS and DFS Algorithms

Before running the simulations, the model’s algorithm was expected to outperform BFS and DFS
searches due to it specifically targeting critical nodes for repair first. However, these two
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algorithms ended up traversing nearly the entire system before repairing all critical nodes. The best
way to explain this is to consider the order by which each algorithm repairs nodes as a static
ordered list. The model’s algorithm sorts this list after nodes are assigned criticality, so the final
critical node that needs to be repaired ends up being close to the front of this list. On the other
hand, BFS and DFS do not consider criticality when sorting this list, so each node’s criticality on
their lists after sorting is effectively random. What determines how many nodes need to be repaired
is ultimately the final critical node in the list, so the odds of this node not being in the final thousand
or even hundred nodes are quite low. Therefore, BFS and DFS will need to repair almost all the
nodes except for when the percentage of critical nodes is lower. When that happens, it is more
likely that the final critical node will be closer to the middle of the repair order instead.
7

TIME-BASED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MODEL

This chapter describes the second proposed model, the time-based damage assessment model.
Like the previous model, this chapter has three sub-chapters: first, any necessary definitions are
established. Next, how the model functions and why it is important is described. Finally, the
algorithm for the model is presented.
7.1

Definitions

Recall that the previous model used an adjacency matrix to represent a data system. In this
model, the adjacency matrix is once again used, however, a second matrix is defined to further
establish the relationships between nodes in the system.
Definition 9: The time-frequency matrix 𝑇𝑇 is an extension of the adjacency matrix. Its rows and
columns are the same as the adjacency matrix. However, the value of an element in the time-
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frequency matrix is the maximum amount of time that can pass between each instance a parent
node updates a child node.
Unlike the adjacency matrix, an element can have a value in this matrix even if there is not a
direct edge between the two nodes. This can happen if there is at least one existing path within
the data system where the child node can indirectly depend on data from the parent node. For an
indirect connection, the value of this element is the sum of all the direct connections along the
“shortest” path between the two nodes.

𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = �

𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 1
𝐸𝐸

𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑘𝑘=1
𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 0

(6)

It is important to note that the frequency of an edge is not always the same for every update.
Therefore, three time-frequency matrices with the following values are established for the
model’s use: the maximum frequency of each edge, the minimum frequency of each edge, and
the frequency of the most recent update of each edge. How these are used is explained in the
following sub-chapter.
7.2

Model Description

The goal of this model is to assess the maximum progress that damage within a system can make
given the amount of time passed since an attack on the initial node. Figure 10 visualizes the steps
taken by the algorithm to make such an assessment. Consider a scenario where node B is
damaged by an attack, and 160 seconds have passed since the attack. All the paths that are
dependent on node B must be traversed to find out if they have been damaged. Each edge has a
frequency range by which the number of seconds that pass before the next update is chosen from
with a specified minimum and maximum value. Since it is of the upmost importance that the
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spread of damage is never underestimated, the minimum value of this range is used to estimate
the damage. In this scenario, the minimum frequency edge between B and D is 10 seconds. D is
then assumed to be damaged, and 10 seconds are subtracted from the total time for determining
if D has any dependent nodes that can be damaged. The edge from D to G has a minimum
frequency of 180 seconds, which is greater than the 150 seconds that could have passed since D
was damaged, so G is assumed to be safe for now. However, the minimum frequency of the edge
from B to E shows that E can be damaged with 40 seconds to spare, and the edge from E to G
has a minimum frequency of only 30 seconds. Therefore, G is now considered damaged through
E, even though it could not have been damaged by D. This example shows the need for an
algorithm performing this task to be thorough and that the worst-case scenario must always be
accounted for during damage assessment.

Figure 10a. Initial frequency graph
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Figure 10b. Updated graph after estimating one path

Figure 10c. Updated graph after estimating two paths
7.3

Model Algorithm

This sub-chapter describes how the algorithm for the model is implemented. Algorithm 4 shows
how the model traverses a data system to determine damage spread. Depending on the type of
time-frequency matrix used, the algorithm can estimate the worst-case or best-case damage
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spread by using the minimum or maximum frequencies of edges respectively or compute the
actual damage using a time-frequency matrix that has the frequency values for the most recent
updates used on each edge. While the actual frequency values are not assumed to be known, this
is used when performing simulations to compare the estimated damage with the actual damage.
Algorithm 4
Result: Finding the fastest paths for damage spread
Parameters: node graph n, adjacency matrix e, time-frequency matrix t
1 Initialize node graph where n’ is the first damaged node and n’t time since the attack
2 Set current node nc to n’
3 While nc has children nodes that have not been traversed
3.1 Pick a child node ny to traverse
3.2 Subtract tc,y from nct for nyt
3.3 if new nyt > old nyt (including the initialization value of 0), update with new value
3.4 set nc to ny and mark ec,y as traversed
3.5 While nc does not have a child node that has not been traversed and nc has a parent
node that has been traversed
3.5.1 set nc to previous node

8

EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MODEL

In this chapter, an attack on a data system is simulated using the adjacency matrix, then the
algorithm is used to estimate the damage caused by the attack. The estimated damaged is
compared to the actual damage simulated, and then the entire subtree of the attacked node is
counted for further analysis.
8.1

Experiment Description

First, the adjacency matrix is built given a specified number of nodes. Edges between nodes are
randomly created until the required parameters are satisfied. Then, each edge is assigned a
random maximum frequency, minimum frequency, and an actual frequency chosen between the
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former two values. The next step is to simulate an attack. Since the random generation of the
graph is volatile and may result in insufficient data if the initially attacked node is also chosen at
random, the node with the largest subtree within the graph is deliberately chosen instead. While
this may not always be the case for real scenarios, the generated graph can instead be envisioned
as a subgraph of a larger, unseen network. The actual damage is simulated using Algorithm 4
with the actual frequencies of the edges as the time-frequency matrix parameter. Finally, damage
assessment is performed using the method. The only information that is assumed to be known is
the initially damaged node, the amount of time since the attack, and the minimum frequency of
each edge. The estimated damage is then returned and compared with the actual damage and how
many nodes are in the subtree.
For this experiment, six different variables were tested for their influence on how many
nodes are estimated to be damaged, how many nodes are actually damaged, and how big the
difference between those two numbers are. Those variables are the total amount of nodes
generated, the total time elapsed since the initial attack, the minimum frequency an edge can
have, the maximum frequency an edge can have, the maximum number of child nodes a node
can have, and the maximum number of parent nodes a node can have. The default values used
for each variable are 3000 total nodes, 300 seconds of total time, a minimum frequency of 30
seconds, a maximum frequency of 60 seconds, and 6 nodes for both the maximum number of
child nodes and parent nodes. The same results from the simulation using the default values are
included for all the experiments, and each experiment’s variable is simulated again with the
value being incremented and decremented twice, for a total of 5 simulations per experiment. The
results are provided in the next sub-chapter.
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8.2

Results and Analysis

The results for each variable are presented in the following graphs. Figure 11a. shows the change
in damage assessment when the total nodes in the graph changes. While the number of nodes in
the subtree increased when the total nodes in the tree increased, the difference between the
estimated damage and the actual damage did not change much. This is because even though the
graph becomes bigger, the variables that affect how far the damage progresses and the difference
between the estimated and actual damage are not changed.

Figure 11a. Change in damage assessment based on total nodes in the system

Experimenting on total time elapsed since the initial damage also had a predictable
outcome as indicated by Figure 11b. When there is more time for the damage to spread, both the
estimated and actual damage get closer to the total nodes in the subtree. The three lines in the
figure eventually converge when enough time elapses for the damage to reach the bottom of the
subtree.
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Figure 11b. Change in damage assessment based on the total time since initial damage

Changing the minimum frequency of edges had a more profound effect on the estimated
damage specifically as shown in Figure 11c. When the minimum frequency was increased, the
estimated damage was more likely to match the actual damage. This can be attributed to a
smaller range causing the estimates to match the actual damage.

Figure 11c. Change in damage assessment based on the minimum frequency of node updates

In Figure 11d., increasing the maximum frequency of edges resulted in less of an
obvious change as increasing the minimum frequency, but it did cause the estimated damage to
widen the gap between it and the actual damage. However, when the difference between the
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minimum and maximum frequencies becomes high enough, the difference between the estimated
and actual damage appears to stabilize even as the maximum frequency increases.

Figure 11d. Change in damage assessment based on the maximum frequency of node updates

However, the most interesting results are in figures 11e. and 11f., as both resulted in changes that
seemed to be exponential. This is because changing the maximum number of child and parent
nodes changes the overall shape of the graph. When there are more child nodes and less parent
nodes, damage can spread to more nodes in less time, because the graph descends in a
“horizontal” fashion. Similarly, more parent nodes and less child nodes results in a graph that
descends “vertically”, and there are less nodes to spread downward to. This causes the two
graphs measuring these changes to mirror each other. Furthermore, a low number of either
maximum children or parent nodes led to a higher effect on the graph’s shape than a higher
number of one variable.
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Figure 11e. Change in damage assessment based on the maximum number of child nodes per
node

Figure 11f. Change in damage assessment based on the maximum number of parent nodes per
node

9

CONCLUSION

This thesis has presented a method to repair data objects that prioritizes quick recovery for the
most important components of a system. This allows for the partial restoration of functions during
the recovery process with an emphasis on restoring service to the most necessary functions. This
was first done by building out three graphs to represent the entire system, what changes the system
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made after an attack, and the cascading damage as a result of those changes. Next, an algorithm
was developed to optimally schedule repairs by using those graphs to find damage paths that affect
the most critical nodes of a system and calculate the fastest repair order to fully restore those nodes.
Results from a simulation of this algorithm and the effects on changing the parameters of the
damage paths showed how optimally planning repairs can allow for critical nodes to be restored
at a fast rate. This work is most applicable to protecting critical infrastructure systems where
services need to be restored as quickly as possible to avoid economic or societal disruptions.
Additionally, this thesis presented a second model in which damage assessment was done using
time-based frequency metrics. This allows for more precise assessments which can result in more
services being made available before recovery begins while still ensuring that no damaged systems
are used. Experiments using this method showed that the shape of the data system influenced the
accuracy of the model more than other factors.
Further work includes integrating these two methods for a more fluid assessment and recovery
operation when an attack occurs. Examples include considering the potential for cascading damage
from edges with faster update times when determining the criticality of a node, or prioritizing
subtrees with the most critical nodes for damage assessment when an attack is detected.
Additionally, a method to select the order of repairs for non-critical objects after all critical objects
have been repaired is needed.
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